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THE NEW CLASS ACTIONS IN JAPAN
Michael J. Madderra †
Abstract:
This comment provides the first journal publication on Japan’s new
class action law, promulgated on December 11, 2013. In the past, Japanese attorneys
used rules of joinder and other alternatives to form de facto class action lawsuits. This
comment provides insight into the development of Japan’s new class action law through a
discussion of the historical context in which it was created. After discussing the law and
its development, this comment argues that Japan should examine U.S. jurisprudence to
prepare for challenges to the new class action system. Comparing Japanese and U.S.
class action systems is appropriate because of similarities in their class formulations.
This comment analyzes recent U.S. court decisions that show controversy and
disagreement about how to interpret the class certification provisions. By looking at
difficulties currently facing U.S. courts, Japan can better prepare itself to implement its
law. Conversely, this comment presents the alternative proposition that due to the
Japanese law’s bifurcated structure, U.S. litigants and courts can look to Japan’s new law
for creative means of litigating class actions.

I.

THE EVOLUTION OF CLASS ACTIONS IN JAPAN

This comment provides the first thorough examination of class action
law in Japan. Until recently, there was no formalized system of class action
lawsuits in Japan.1 Class action lawsuits were informally processed through
the use of joinder and consolidation under the Japanese civil code, but these
processes were not widely used for large numbers of plaintiffs.2 Although
injured parties could join cases with similar facts, such parties were
plaintiffs who actually appeared in the case—they did not represent those
“who did not join in the lawsuit.”3 Japan did not have the simplified opt-in
or opt-out systems available in Europe and the United States. 4 While
†

Michael J. Madderra is a 2014 J.D. candidate at the University of Washington School of Law. He
received his B.A. with honors from Stanford University in 2011. The author would like to thank Elizabeth
Porter, Carl F. Goodman, Brittany A. Harris, Nobu Yamanouchi, Shigenori Matsui, and the editorial staff
of the Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal for providing invaluable assistance. Their support was
instrumental in completing this comment.
1
Carl F. Goodman, Japan’s New Civil Procedure Code: Has it Fostered a Rule of Law Dispute
Resolution Mechanism?, 29 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 511, 589 (2004); Kengo Nishigaki & Takeshi Yoshida, The
New Class Action Legislation Promulgated in Japan, BAKER & MCKENZIE 1 (Jan. 24, 2014),
http://bakermckenzie.co.jp/e/material/dl/supportingyourbusiness/newsletter/disputeresolution/ClientAlert_2
01401_DisputeResolution_E.pdf (last visited May 17, 2014).
2
Nishigaki & Yoshida, supra note 1, at 1.
3
Goodman 2004, supra note 1, at 590.
4
See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23; Katharina Diel, International Practice: Overview/Comparison of
U.S. & E.U. Judicial Class Action Structures, CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOL. (CPR) INST. FOR DISP.
RESOL.,
http://www.cpradr.org/Resources/ALLCPRArticles/tabid/265/ID/593/International-PracticeOverviewComparison-of-US-EU-Judicial-Class-Action-Structures-Web.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2014).
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research is available on Japan’s previous group litigation methods, such
material is sparse due to the system’s limited use.
Since 2000, Japan modernized its class action system, 5 as
demonstrated by the allowance of injunctive relief for groups of consumers
in 20076 and the creation of a new class action law in December 2013.7 This
modernization has not come without resistance. Japanese culture tends to
prioritize alternate dispute resolution mechanisms, such as mediation, rather
than litigation.8 Despite this reluctance towards class action and litigation
generally, Japan will benefit greatly from its new class action system. A
formal class action system promotes judicial economy and provides
predictability, consistency, and a means for unprotected consumers to obtain
judicial remedy. In December 2013, Japan codified a consumer class action
system that is set to take effect within the next three years.9 This law
directly impacts consumers’ ability to recover from harmful business
practices and product defects.10 Additionally, this law will significantly
impact corporations doing business with consumers in Japan.11
This author argues that Japan should look to U.S. case law to prepare
for unexpected difficulties it may encounter in implementing its new class
action law. Providing a defined set of class action rules will encourage
lawsuits against those that take actions adverse to consumers’ interests;12 the
5

See generally JUST. SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JUSTICE SYS. REFORM
COUNCIL – FOR A JUST. SYS. TO SUPPORT JAPAN IN THE 21ST CENTURY (June 12, 2001), available
at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/judiciary/2001/0612report.html [hereinafter REFORM COUNCIL].
6
A New Class Action System in Japan (New Act Enacted and Promulgated in December 2013),
ANDERSON MŌRI & TOMOTSUNE 1 (Jan. 2014), https://www.amt-law.com/en/pdf/bulletins4_pdf/
140114.pdf (last visited May 17, 2014); see generally Shōhishakeiyakuhō [The Consumer Contract Act],
Law No. 61 of 2000, http://www.consumer.go.jp/kankeihourei/keiyaku/file/keiyakuhou_1.pdf (Japan),
translated in http://www.consumer.go.jp/english/cca/index.html#3-2 [hereinafter Consumer Contract Act
translation].
7
See generally Shōhisha no zaisan-teki higai no shūdan-tekina kaifuku no tame no minji no saiban
tetsudzuki no tokurei ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on Special Provisions of Civil Court Procedures for Collective
Recovery of Property Damage of Consumers], Act No. 96 of 2013, http://www.caa.go.jp/planning/
pdf/130419-2_131213.pdf (Japan) [hereinafter 2013 Class Action Law]; see also ANDERSON MŌRI &
TOMOTSUNE, supra note 6.
8
See Ikuo Sugawara, The Current Situation of Class Action in Japan, GLOBAL CLASS ACTION
EXCHANGE
3
(2007),
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/Japan_
National_Report.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2014); Nishigaki & Yoshida, supra note 1, at 1 (noting that
“many consumers are reluctant to file [lawsuits]”); Goodman 2004, supra note 1, at 513.
9
Shōhisha no zaisan-teki higai no shūdan-tekina kaifuku no tame no minji no saiban tetsudzuki no
tokurei ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on Special Provisions of Civil Court Procedures for Collective Recovery of
Property Damage of Consumers], Act No. 96 of 2013, available at http://www.caa.go.jp/planning/pdf/
130419-2_131213.pdf (Japan); see ANDERSON MŌRI & TOMOTSUNE, supra note 6.
10
See ANDERSON MŌRI & TOMOTSUNE, supra note 6, at 1, 4.
11
Nishigaki & Yoshida, supra note 1, at 1.
12
See ANDERSON MŌRI & TOMOTSUNE, supra note 6, at 5 (stating that the new law “will increase
the risk of litigation for business operators from consumers”).
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class action system should thus encourage responsible social behavior. In
the United States, the class certification system effectuates the legal goals of
efficiency, consistency, and consumer protection, but it is subject to
controversy and divergent judicial interpretation.13 The U.S. system, while
not perfect, highlights the benefits of a developed class action system, as
explained in Part IV, infra.
This comment begins in Part II by introducing the history of class
action litigation in Japan. Part III describes the current state of class action
lawsuits in Japan, as well as the recently passed law. Part IV explains the
class action system used in the United States. Examining the U.S. class
action system is appropriate because Japan’s legal system post-World War II
was influenced by American procedural philosophy and the common law
system.14 This similarity makes direct comparisons possible, and means that
the experiments with class actions in one country could inform innovation in
the other. Part IV also examines recent difficulties that American courts
have faced in interpreting their own class action laws. By examining the
issues U.S. judges have faced in interpreting class action law, Japan can
prepare itself for similar challenges. In Part V, this comment explains how
Japan’s new class action law provides a unique opportunity to benefit
consumers. Lastly, this comment suggests that Japan’s new law, with its
bifurcated structure, may provide a blueprint to resolve some of the issues
present in U.S. class action litigation.
II.

THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM

This Part discusses the Japanese legal system’s structure. First, this
Part looks at Japan’s Constitution and court system. Though Japanese
culture has historically been considered reluctant towards litigation,15 that
perception is slowly changing.16 Pressure to reform the legal system built up
in the 1990s17 and resulted in the creation of a new Civil Procedure Code,18
the development of new law schools,19 and eventually the creation of Japan’s
new class action law.20 Before discussing the new class action law, this Part

13

See infra Part IV.
TAKAAKI HATTORI & DAN FENNO HENDERSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN § 1.03[3] &
§ 1.04[6][a] (Taniguchi et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009).
15
See infra note 44.
16
See infra note 52.
17
See infra note 50.
18
See infra note 72.
19
See infra note 63.
20
See supra note 7.
14
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addresses the aggregate litigation substitutes that preceded class action in
Japan.
A.

Basic Principles of the Japanese Legal System

The Japanese legal system incorporates elements of both European
and American legal systems.21 Its adoption of American legal practices can
be traced back to the U.S. occupation of Japan after World War II.22 Carl F.
Goodman, law professor at Georgetown University and Tokyo University,
explained that between the American post-War occupation and present times,
“the Japanese tended to avoid using the legal system to resolve disputes, and
instead used more traditional models of alternative dispute resolution . . .
characterized by conciliation, compromise and mediation.”23 This avoidance
helps explain the lack of a developed class action system in Japan.
In the aftermath of World War II, Japan adopted a new Constitution.24
The Constitution provided structure to the government and guidance to a
new Japanese legal system. 25 The Constitution contains three basic
principles: sovereignty rests with the people, Japan desires peaceful
cooperation with other countries, and laws must respect fundamental human
rights. 26 These principles place Japan’s power with its people. 27 The
judicial system is headed by a Supreme Court, 28 and is comprised of

21

Goodman 2004, supra note 1, at 513.
Id.
23
Id.
24
On October 4, 1945, at a meeting with General MacArthur, a Japanese cabinet member asked
whether General MacArthur had instructions “about the make-up of the government.” Creation of the
Japanese Constitution (1945-1946), PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/macarthur/peopleevents/pande
AMEX102.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2014). Due to a mistranslation, the word “make-up” was replaced
with “constitution,” and the Japanese cabinet member left the meeting believing that MacArthur ordered
the creation of a new constitution. Id.
25
See id.
26
See generally NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION] (Japan), translated in
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html) (stating the
following: “sovereign power resides with the people[,]”; “we shall secure for ourselves and our posterity
the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations[,]”; and “[t]he people shall not be prevented from
enjoying any of the fundamental human rights.”).
27
Though the legal foundations of the Japanese Constitution are beyond the scope of this comment,
the reader might be interested to further study Japan and the rule of law. Some argue that the Japanese
Constitution is based on the concept of the rule of law. See HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 26 (3d ed. 2009).
Others argue, however, that Japan has failed to attain the rule of law in its legal system. See Setsuo
Miyazawa & Hiroshi Otsuka, Legal Education and the Reproduction of the Elite in Japan. 1 ASIAN-PAC. L.
& POL’Y J. 2, 18 (2000); Setsuo Miyazawa, Reform in Japanese Legal Education: The Politics of Judicial
Reform in Japan: The Rule of Law at Last?, 2 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 89, 107 (2001).
28
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 76 (Japan).
22
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fourteen Justices and a Chief Justice.29 Beneath the Supreme Court are the
inferior courts.30 The inferior courts include eight High Courts, fifty District
Courts, fifty Family Courts, and 438 Summary Courts.31
Japan’s court system can be thought of as having four tiers. At the top
tier is the Supreme Court, which has final appellate review power.32 Below
the Supreme Court sit the High Courts, which conduct appellate reviews.33
On the third tier are the District and Family Courts.34 The District Courts
are courts of general and original jurisdiction, while the Family Courts
handle family matters and juvenile cases.35 The Summary Courts are part of
a quasi-fourth tier. 36 The Summary Courts oversee some civil matters
(depending on the monetary amount at stake) and minor criminal cases.37
Critics attack the Japanese legal system for its slow process, lack of
litigation tools for plaintiffs, and low participation levels by citizens. 38
While many view the United States as a country that favors litigation,
Japanese people typically avoid litigation.39 As one author commented, “[a]
29

Overview of the Judicial System in Japan, SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, http://www.courts.go.jp/
english/judicial_sys/overview_of/overview/index.html#02 (last visited Apr. 16, 2014) [hereinafter
SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN].
30
Id.
31
Id.; Junko Gono et al., Overview of Legal Systems in the Asia-Pacific Region: Japan,
SCHOLARSHIP@CORNELL LAW, Apr. 10, 2004, at 8-9; Elliott J. Hahn, Perspective: An Overview of the
Japanese Legal System, 5 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 517, 533 (1983).
32
SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, supra note 29.
33
Gono, supra note 31, at 8.
34
SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, supra note 29.
35
Gono, supra note 31, at 8.
36
See SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, supra note 29 (chart showing Summary Courts on the fourth row
of the court system).
37
Gono, supra note 31, at 9.
38
Toshiko Takenaka, Comparison of U.S. and Japanese Court Systems for Patent Litigation: A
Special Court or Special Division in a General Court?, 5 SYMPOSIUM OF CTR. FOR ADVANCED STUDY
& RES. ON INTELL. PROP. 47, 1 (July 2000), available at http://www.law.washington.edu/casrip/
symposium/number5/pub5atcl6.pdf (stating that “U.S. patent owners and domestic industries have long
complained about the slow and inadequate relief provided by Japanese courts in patent infringement
cases”); Goodman 2004, supra note 1, at 526 (noting that “the Japanese judicial system has drawn its
boundaries in a manner less favorable to plaintiffs”); R. Daniel Kelemen & Eric C. Sibbitt, The
Americanization of Japanese Law, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 269, 294-95 (2002) (showing that in 2002
Japan had roughly one lawyer for every 7,000 residents. By comparison, in 2000 the United States had one
lawyer for every 300 residents); Carl F. Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant: Japan’s
Changing View Towards Civil Litigation, 32 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 769, 797 (2001) [hereinafter
Goodman 2001] (“[There are] huge court backlogs and a litigation system wherein cases may take years to
try.”).
39
Takeyoshi Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan, in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYS.,
CASES, CODES, AND COMMENT. 176, 176 (Curtis J. Milhaupt et al. eds., 2d ed. 2012); see also Steve Lohr,
Tokyo Air Crash: Why Japanese Do Not Sue, in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYS., CASES, CODES, AND COMMENT.
166 (Curtis J. Milhaupt et al. eds., 2d ed. 2012); J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Are Americans
More Litigious? Some Quantitative Evidence, in THE AM. ILLNESS: ESSAYS ON THE RULE OF LAW 4 (Yale
U. Press ed., 2013).
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Japanese plaintiff must have knowledge of facts and witnesses to support his
or her case before filing a complaint.” 40 Potential litigants must take
numerous factors into account before filing a lawsuit in Japan. Compared to
the United States, monetary damage awards are relatively low. 41
Additionally, Japanese courts do not award punitive damages. 42 These
factors contribute to a legal system that makes winning less lucrative for
plaintiffs. Even when victory is likely, filing a lawsuit is a lengthy process
and may not be worth the expense and time. In Japan, “it is not
unusual . . . for complex lawsuits to take more than 10 years to go through
the courts.”43 In sum, the Japanese legal system has discouraged lawsuits.44
Proponents of reforming the Japanese legal system argue that the system
needs to better address the Japanese peoples’ needs45 and increase citizens’
participation.46
Japan has taken steps to liberalize its legal system in order to expedite
lawsuits and ensure judicial fairness,47 but this comment argues that its lack
of a developed class action system has harmed consumers. In Japan, “it is
difficult to protect the interests of a large number of plaintiffs as with class
actions. In this respect, the Japanese system may be insufficient in
providing redress to victims. In particular, parties seeking small amounts
may simply give up any opportunity of receiving compensation.” 48
Plaintiffs have faced an uphill battle in Japan. For example, between 1947
and 1985, no private antitrust lawsuit succeeded in Japanese courts.49 Mass
tort, antitrust, and employment class action claimants remained without the
necessary tools to satisfactorily litigate their disputes.
40

Goodman 2001, supra note 38, at 789.
Id. at 794.
42
Id.
43
Suan Chira, If You Insist on Your Day in Court, You May Wait and Wait and Wait, in THE
JAPANESE LEGAL SYS., supra note 39, at 168.
44
“In Japan . . . the harmony of community is valued most and people go to court only as a last
resort.” Steve Lohr, supra note 39, at 166, 167; Leslie Helm, A Look at Japan’s Efforts to Discourage
Lawsuits, Jan. 14, 1991, http://lesliehelm.com/a-look-at-japans-efforts-to-discourage-lawsuits/ (last visited
May 7, 2014); see generally Tom Ginsburg & Glenn Hoetker, The Unreluctant Litigant? An Empirical
Analysis of Japan’s Turn to Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 31 (2006).
45
One such “need” includes “clarifying legal rules . . . as to ease the resolution of ‘various
disputes[.]’” George Schumann, Beyond Litigation: Legal Education Reform in Japan and What Japan’s
New Lawyers Will Do, 13 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 475, 516 (2006).
46
Id. at 515.
47
Goodman 2001, supra note 38, at 809-10.
48
Koji Shindo, Settlement of Disputes of Securities Transactions, 14 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 399 (1991). Koji Shindo argues that class action suits are needed to improve Japan’s legal system. Id.
at 403 (stating that “it is urgent that the merits of the introduction of class action suits and a discovery
system into Japanese law through legislative amendment be considered”).
49
J. Mark Ramseyer, The Costs of the Consensual Myth: Antitrust Enforcement and Institutional
Barriers to Litigation in Japan, 94 YALE L.J. 604, 617 (1985).
41
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Pressure to reform the legal system began to boil over following the
burst of Japan’s economic bubble in the early 1990s.50 The crisis may have
served as a catalyst, revealing to the government that change was needed.51
The increase in litigation in Japan between 1986 and 200252 may have also
signaled to the government that reform was necessary.
In 1999, Japan took the first steps towards reforming its legal
system.53 Former Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi proposed creating a reformorientated advisory council, which was officially established by the Japanese
Congress, the National Diet.54 This Justice System Reform Council, an
independent commission,55 issued numerous recommendations to reform the
legal system. 56 One of the recommendations included studying group
litigation and comparing it to the Japanese sentei tojisha rule.57 The sentei
tojisha rule, discussed in Part II.B., is a Japanese alternative to class action.
The Council took note of the German and American class action systems58
and determined that the sentei tojisha rule should perform a function similar
to a class action system.59
These recommendations were not purely political, as several of them
resulted in substantive changes to Japan’s legal landscape. In 2001, Japan
implemented major judicial reform to modernize the judicial system. 60
These initial reforms, including speeding up the judicial process and
increasing the availability of attorneys, were designed to make the judicial
system more accessible to members of the public.61 In addition to making
changes to the courts, the government implemented a new law school system
to overhaul legal training.62

50

Ginsburg & Hoetker, supra note 44, at 36; HIROSHI ODA, supra note 27, at 57.
Mariko Fujii & Masahiro Kawai, Lessons from Japan’s Banking Crisis, 1991-2005, 9 (Asian
Dev. Bank Inst., Working Paper No. 222, 2010), available at http://www.adbi.org/files/2010.06.29.wp222.
lessons.japan.banking.crisis.1991.2005.pdf (“[A]uthorities lacked the legal framework to resolve troubled,
large financial institutions.”).
52
See Ginsburg & Hoetker, supra note 44, at 36-37.
53
See Daniel H. Foote, Forces Driving and Shaping Legal Training Reform in Japan, in THE
JAPANESE LEGAL SYS., supra note 39, at 72.
54
Id.
55
James R. Maxeiner & Keiichi Yamanaka, The New Japanese Law Schools: Putting the
Professional into Legal Education, 13 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 303, 310 (2004).
56
Id.; see generally REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 5.
57
REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 5, at ch. II pt. 1 § 7.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
HIROSHI ODA, supra note 27, at 55-56.
61
Id.
62
See generally Maxeiner & Yamanaka, supra note 55.
51
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Japan implemented a new law school system in 2004 and created sixty
new law schools.63 According to the Justice System Reform Council, new
law schools aimed to be “professional schools providing education
especially for training for the legal profession.”64 This means that the new
schools focus on training students to think in legal terms, and “provide
compulsory instruction in core legal subjects of private and public law.”65
While the new schools have been relatively successful in meeting the
Reform Council’s goals of “expand[ing] the quality and quantity” of
attorneys,66 they have not met all their stated goals. For example, every
person who aspires to be a lawyer in Japan must gain admittance to the
Legal Training and Research Institute.67 To gain admittance, applicants must
pass an exam that is administered annually. 68 The exam is extremely
difficult; on average, an applicant must take the exam five times before he
passes.69 With the new law schools and a newly implemented bar exam, the
Reform Council anticipated that the exam passage rate would increase to
between seventy to eighty percent of all applicants rather than the previous
system’s two to three percent admission rate.70 The passage rate rose in
2009, but only to 27.6 percent.71
In 1996, the Japanese Diet reworked the Civil Procedure Code,72
which was last amended in 2006.73 The Code’s revisions include additional
discovery mechanisms and simplification of small claims procedures. 74
These revisions imply that Japan has begun a transition to improve legal
tools for plaintiffs.75
The changes to the judicial and law school systems show that the
Japanese government wants its legal system to accommodate today’s legal
needs. The changes have a large impact on the Japanese legal system.
Though the new law school system did not create the seventy percent exam
63

Id. at 303.
Id. at 313 (citing REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 5, at ch. III, pt. 2, §1).
65
Id. at 318.
66
Id. at 311.
67
Id. at 309.
68
Id. at 310.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 312; Bruce E. Aronson, The Brave New World of Lawyers in Japan Revisited: Proceedings
of a Panel Discussion on the Japanese Legal Profession After the 2008 Financial Crisis and the 2011
Tohoku Earthquake, 21 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 255, 272 (2012).
71
Id.
72
MINJI SOSHŌHŌ [MINSOHŌ] [C. CIV. PRO.] 1996 (Japan), translated in http://www.oapi.wipo.
net/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=8909 (last visited Apr. 16, 2014).
73
Id.
74
Goodman 2001, supra note 38, at 797.
75
Others have argued that factors such as economic liberalization and fragmentation of political
authority have contributed to this transition. See Kelemen & Sibbitt, supra note 38, at 271-72.
64
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passage rate that the Reform Council expected, the jump from three percent
to twenty-six percent is sizeable. This has led some commentators to
conclude that “the Japanese legal profession has emerged form its insularity
and limited social role.”76 This legal transformation will have wide-reaching
impact on Japanese business and society.
B.

Before Group Action, there was Joinder, Consolidation, and the Sentei
Tojisha Rule

Until the new class action law was promulgated on December 11,
2013, Japan utilized various systems to replicate group litigation. 78
Consumer groups could file for injunctions on behalf of a consumer class79
but they could not recover damages for consumers.80 Japan has also relied
on a more established system of joinder.81 Under Article 38 of the Japanese
Code of Civil Procedure, when the rights or liabilities for an action are the
same and are based on the same kinds of facts and law, then those harmed
may sue as co-litigants.82 This rule is the Japanese version of joinder and
may be used for small or large numbers of litigants.83
Litigation using joinder procedure is difficult, as courts must name
and give notice to each plaintiff individually.84 The system is not structured
to accommodate large numbers of plaintiffs. Additionally, using the joinder
procedure is at the court’s discretion; the court may instead choose to issue
individual judgments or settlements. 85 This discretion may create
inconsistent results. Courts treat Japanese plaintiffs filing group actions less
like a group and more like individual plaintiffs. 86 This treatment is
significant, as Japanese lower court judges face a huge caseload and could
benefit from increased judicial efficiency.87 While joinder allows several
77

76

Aronson, supra note 70, at 285.
Nishigaki & Yoshida, supra note 1, at 1.
78
See generally Goodman 2004, supra note 1; Goodman 2001, supra note 38; Nancy L. Young,
Japan’s New Products Liability Law: Increased Protection for Consumers, 18 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.
J. 893, 900-01 (1996).
79
Sugawara, supra note 8, at 20.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 4.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Ikuo Sugawara, Japan, 622 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. AND SOC. SCI. 280, 281 (2009).
85
Id.
86
See Sugawara, supra note 8, at 5 (“When this method is adopt[ed] . . . authorization from each
individual party is required.”).
87
John O. Haley, The Japanese Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy and Public Trust, in
THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYS., supra note 39, at 129, 131.
77
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hundred plaintiffs to join a complaint,88 it creates complicated and difficult
legal situations. This is problematic because “depending on the contents of
the evidence and the progress of the trial, there is no guarantee that the
contents of judgments will be the same for the parties and settlements or
withdraw of claims may also happen. Separate appeals to the judgments
may also occur.”89 Varying judgments or settlements are not ideal because
they could create inconsistency in the legal system. Additionally, separate
appeals increase the workload of, and costs to, the judiciary. Although
attorneys have been able to use joinder in the absence of a formal class
action system, a formalized system could bring more stability and certainty
to the legal system.
Japanese attorneys have used two other methods of group action
without the benefit of class action. These are seikyu no heigou (judicial
consolidation)90 and the sentei tojisha rule (chosen party system).91 If all of
the plaintiffs’ claims are in one court, that court has the ability to consolidate
oral arguments. 92 Consolidation is not always feasible, particularly in
consumer products liability cases, because “[g]iven today’s mass production
and advanced distribution systems . . . users of any single product are likely
to be spread out among many districts.”93 This diffusion could preclude
plaintiffs from using consolidation, as the claims are not likely to be in the
same court.94
The sentei tojisha rule, enabled by Article 47 of the Code of Civil
Procedure,95 allows a single party to act as the representative on behalf of all
plaintiffs.96 All plaintiffs must authorize the representative party.97 Further,
the decision given to the representative party applies to all group members
through the principle of res judicata.98 This approach puts the power of
litigation into the hands of one party99 and increases the likelihood that the
other plaintiffs will either be displeased with the result or discouraged from
joining the representative litigation in the first place.100 Although the sentei
tojisha rule creates consistent outcomes for plaintiffs, the rule has been
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

See Sugawara, supra note 8, at 4.
Id. at 5.
Nishigaki & Yoshida, supra note 1, at 1.
REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 5, at § 7(4)(b).
Young, supra note 78, at 900.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 901.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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ineffective as a means of providing relief for large numbers of plaintiffs;
usually, sentei tojisha representation results in a small group of plaintiffs.101
III.

THE CURRENT STATE OF JAPANESE CLASS ACTION LAW

This Part looks at the most recent developments in Japanese class
action law. It begins by discussing the creation of the Consumer Affairs
Agency in 2009 and the 2012 proposed class action legislation. After
discussing the components of the proposed law, it examines the law as it was
passed in December 2013. Later, the comment argues that Japan should
look to the U.S. class action system to examine the benefits of class actions
as well as the potential legal complications they can create.
A.

The Consumer Affairs Agency Class Action Proposal

The Japanese government created the Consumer Affairs Agency
(“CAA”) in September 2009. 102 This agency is a central system for
investigating consumer complaints.103 It was formed as a result of several
failures by the Japanese government to address public safety concerns, such
as an illegal distribution of tainted rice, carbon monoxide poisoning from
gas water heaters, and poisoning from certain imported foods.104 In 2010,
the agency began searching for a solution to Japan’s disjointed class action
system.105 The CAA formed a study group composed of academics, which
proposed four options for a potential class action system.106
The CAA officially proposed a new class action system for Japan in
107
2012.
The proposed legislation, called the “Litigation System Relating to

101

Id.
For a Society with Security, Safety, and Comfortable Living, CONSUMER AFFAIRS AGENCY 3 2010,
www.caa.go.jp/en/pdf/caa.pdf.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
New Report by the Consumer Affairs Agency Suggests Class Actions May be Coming to Japan,
CLIENT ALERT 1 (DLA Piper Tokyo Partnership) (Sept. 2010) (on file with author).
106
Id.
107
See Comments of the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform on the Consumer Affairs Agency’s
Proposal entitled Litigation System Relating to Recovering Damages for a Consumer Class, U.S.
CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/Japan__ILR_Comments_to_CAA_CA_proposal_9-3-2012.pdf (last visited May 23, 2014); see generally Shōhi
seikatsu ni kansuru kihon-tekina seido ya kankyō-dzukuri o susumemasu (消費生活に関する基本的な制
度や環境づくりを進めます) [The Litigation System Proposed in Accordance with Collective Consumer
Damage Recovery], SHŌHISHACHŌ ( 消 費 者 庁 ) [CONSUMER AFFAIRS AGENCY],
http://www.caa.go.jp/planning/index12.html (last visited May 23, 2014) [hereinafter CONSUMER AFFAIRS
AGENCY System Proposal].
102
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Recovering Damages for a Consumer Class,” 108 was a much-needed,
comprehensive plan of action. To ensure the creation of a class action
system appropriate for Japan, the CAA conducted several surveys and
reports on the class action systems in various countries.109 These countries
included the United Kingdom, Portugal, South Korea, the United States,
Germany, France, Canada, and Brazil.110 The department created an initial
plan for the class action system and allowed a one-month public comment
period that ended in September 2012.111 The comments enabled the CAA to
better address concerns of opinions from consumers and businesses directly
impacted by the proposed class action system.112
The 2012 proposal would have altered existing procedure governed by
the Consumer Contract Act.113 This act, which came into effect in April
2001, aims to “protect the interests of consumers, and thereby contribute to
the stabilization of and the improvement in the general welfare and life of
the citizens . . . ”114 Pursuant to these goals, the Act was amended in 2007 to
allow for the creation and certification of Qualified Consumer Organizations
(“QCO”).115 A QCO is certified by the Prime Minister116 and is given the
power to sue for injunctive relief on behalf of consumers. 117 There are
currently only eleven organizations certified as QCOs.118 The 2012 proposal

108

Japan, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/
international/japan (last visited Apr. 17, 2014).
109
The CAA has a sample of surveys and reports conducted on the collective consumer damage
systems, including the United States, Canada, Germany, and Brazil. SHŌHISHACHŌ ( 消 費 者 庁 )
[CONSUMER AFFAIRS AGENCY], http://www.caa.go.jp/planning/index.html#m01-1 (last visited May 24,
2014).
110
Id.
111
CONSUMER AFFAIRS AGENCY System Proposal, supra note 107.
112
Id.
113
See Shōhishakeiyakuhō [The Consumer Contract Act], available at http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgibin/idxselect.cgi?IDX_OPT=1&H_NAME=%8f%c1%94%ef%8e%d2&H_NAME_YOMI=%82%a0&H_
NO_GENGO=H&H_NO_YEAR=&H_NO_TYPE=2&H_NO_NO=&H_FILE_NAME=H12HO061&H_R
YAKU=1&H_CTG=1&H_YOMI_GUN=1&H_CTG_GUN=1 (Japan), translated in http://www.consumer.
go.jp/english/cca/index.html#3-2 [hereinafter Consumer Contract Act translation].
114
Id.
115
Sugawara, supra note 8, at 6-7.
116
The Prime Minister has the authority to certify QCOs under Article 2, paragraph 4 of the
Consumer Contract Act. Consumer Contract Act translation, supra note 113, at art. 2 (4).
117
Id. at art. 13(1).
118
Nishigaki & Yoshida, supra note 1, at 2.
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allowed a Specified Qualified Consumer Organization (“SQCO”)119 to begin
the class action process.120
The proposal included two stages.121 In the first stage, a SQCO would
file the lawsuit on consumers’ behalf and ask the court to determine
common issues of law and fact.122 Only a certified SQCO could file the
class action lawsuit 123 and could file the lawsuit only against business
operators. 124 Consumers could affect only the initial class action
proceedings indirectly. Under the proposal, the SQCO could only bring four
types of legal claims against the defendants: 1) unjust enrichment resulting
from cancellation of a Consumer Contract; 2) performance of a Consumer
Contract; 3) tort liability under the Civil Code; and 4) default of a Consumer
Contract or product defect under a Consumer Contract.125 The proposal
limited claims to monetary relief and made criminal charges unavailable.126
Once the lawsuit and charges were filed, the SQCO would have to prove
three elements. First, the SQCO would have to show numerosity—that is,
that a significant number of consumers were affected. Second, they would
need to prove commonality. That is, that the damages suffered by the
consumers resulted from the same cause. Third, the common issues between
the consumers would have to be “dominant,” and the SQCO would have to
demonstrate that the consumers clearly had claims.127
If the SQCO succeeded at trial on the common issues, then the lawsuit
would move to the second stage.128 The second stage constituted a damages
phase where individual consumers harmed by the defendants could step
119

As is explained in the next section, the new class action law as promulgated establishes Specified
Qualified Consumer Organizations (SQCO). The difference between a QCO and SQCO is in their fee
structure. Some sources refer to SQCOs as Certified Qualified Consumer Organizations, which appears to
be a translation difference. For the purposes of this comment, the author refers to these organizations as
SQCOs.
120
An editorial in The Japan Times notes that “[a]s of January 2013, some 30 consumer lawsuits had
been filed. But consumer organizations do not have enough funds and experts to file and continue classaction lawsuits.” Protecting Consumers Against Fraud, JAPAN TIMES, Jan. 13, 2014, available at
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/01/13/editorials/protecting-consumers-against-fraud/#.
UzJVrq1dV3Y [hereinafter JAPAN TIMES Fraud].
121
Kozo Kawai et al., Japan, in THE PRIVATE COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT REV. 254 (Ilene
Knable Gotts ed., 5th ed. 2012), available at http://www.jurists.co.jp/ja/publication/tractate/docs/PCER_
Fifth.pdf; Japanese Class Action Legislation – How to Protect your Business, THE AM. CHAMBER OF COM.
IN JAPAN, Nov 12, 2012, http://accj.tajera.com/en/events/details/19340-japanese-class-action-legislationhow-to-protect-your-business (last visited Apr. 27, 2014).
122
ANDERSON MŌRI & TOMOTSUNE, supra note 6, at 2.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 4.
126
See id.
127
Id. at 5.
128
Id. at 2.
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forward and receive damages.129 This stage also included a trial for the
individual issues that arose as the consumers claimed damages.130 The
SQCO would provide public notice for consumers to participate in the
second stage, and it would be the responsibility of each individual to step
forward.131 The second stage would be a de facto opt-in132 form of class
action, where those who failed to opt in would be excluded from the results
of the proceedings. The court would issue a decision at the end of the
second stage, choosing to issue an injunction, award damages, or do
nothing.133 After the decision, the parties would then turn to the usual
litigation process.134
B.

The Japanese Government Passes a Class Action Law

On April 19, 2013, the Japanese Cabinet approved the class action
proposal and sent it to the Shugi-in (the Japanese House of Representatives)
for debate and a vote.135 The class action law, the Act on Special Provisions
of Civil Court Procedures for Collective Recovery of Property Damage of
Consumers (Act No. 96 of 2013),136 was promulgated on December 11,
2013.137 The law is set to take effect in 2016, three years after its passage by
the Diet.138 Not everyone is pleased with the law. Before the Cabinet
passed it, Keidanren (the Japan Business Federation) issued a joint statement
with the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry in opposition of the
129

Id.
See id. at 6 (“If the business operator disputes the amount or existence of any or all of the
consumers’ claims as contained in the SQCO’s notice, the court will issue a decision relating to the amount
or existence of the various consumers’ claims.”).
131
Id. at 4, 6.
132
U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 108.
133
See ANDERSON MŌRI & TOMOTSUNE, supra note 6, at 1-2.
134
Id.
135
Japanese Litigation Update, QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN LLP 9, Dec. 9, 2013,
http://www.quinnemanuel.com/media/469099/december%202013%20business%20litigation%20report.pdf;
Editorial, Consumer Protection System, JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 28, 2013, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/
opinion/2013/04/28/editorials/consumer-protection-system/#.Upx8p2RDt3Z (last visited May 17, 2014);
Nishigaki & Yoshida, supra note 1, at 4.
136
2013 Class Action Law, supra note 7; ANDERSON MŌRI & TOMOTSUNE, supra note 6.
137
Act on Special Provisions of court proceedings for civil recovery of the collective property of the
casualties of the consumer, CONSUMER AFFAIRS AGENCY, http://www.caa.go.jp/planning/index14.html
(last visited May 23, 2014); Nishigaki & Yoshida, supra note 1.
138
SHŌHISHACHŌ (消費者庁) [CONSUMER AFFAIRS AGENCY], SHŌHISHA NO ZAISAN-TEKI HIGAI NO
SHŪDAN-TEKINA KAIFUKU NO TAME NO MINJI NO SAIBAN TETSUDZUKI NO TOKUREI NI KANSURU HŌRITSU NI
TSUITE (消費者の財産的被害の集団的な回復のための民事の裁判手続の特例に関する法律につい
て) [FOR THE ACT ON SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF CIVIL COURT PROCEDURES FOR COLLECTIVE RECOVERY OF
PROPERTY DAMAGE OF CONSUMERS], available at http://www.caa.go.jp/planning/pdf/1304190_131213.pdf.
130
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proposal.139 Keidanren, a large Japanese organization comprised of 1,300
Japanese companies, debates political issues that are of interest to those
companies.140 Members of the Japanese business community have resisted
class action laws as “[s]etting a class-action precedent would . . . be a
nightmare for Japanese companies[.]”141 As SQCOs file class action suits on
behalf of consumers, it follows that the natural defendants of such
lawsuits—businesses—will resist new laws expanding the potential for those
lawsuits. The U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform issued a twelvepage statement on the potential dangers and problems that may arise from
Japan’s proposal.142 The statement attacks central elements of class action
systems generally, saying that class action lawsuits are “inherently more
vulnerable to abuse than individual lawsuits.”143
Others, such as the editorial staff of The Japan Times, endorsed the
Cabinet’s proposal.144 Proponents of the law argued it will allow injured
consumers to receive compensation for harm done to them, whereas the
previous laws only enabled them to receive injunctive relief.145 Further, they
argued that class action lawsuits and SQCOs’ augmented ability to seek
damages can “establish meaningful precedents” and “work . . . more
efficiently for the overall public good.”146 Consumers International, a proconsumer group, argued that the new proposal “ha[s] features specifically
designed to prevent abuse[.]”147 Further, proponents note the provision that
binds all QCOs to first-stage judicial decisions148 will “prevent multiple
lawsuits on the same issue.”149
While the Consumer Contract Act first created QCOs in 2007,150 the
2012 proposal 151 and the 2013 class action law establish tekikakushou
139

Urgent Proposition on the Japanese Class Action System (Shudan Sosho Seido), KEIDANDREN,
Mar. 25, 2013, http://www.keidanren.or.jp/en/policy/2013/023.html (last visited May 17, 2014).
140
About KEIDANREN, KEIDANDREN, http://www.keidanren.or.jp/en/profile/pro001.html (last
visited Apr. 17, 2014).
141
Tomohiro Osaki, U.S.-style class action? Unlikely for Tepco Suits, JAPAN TIMES, Aug. 5, 2013,
available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/08/05/reference/u-s-style-class-action-unlikely-fortepco-suits/#.Uo6rSGR4aDk (last visited May 17, 2014).
142
U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 107.
143
Id. at 2.
144
Consumer Protection System, supra note 135.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Japan Government Considers Group Action Plan, CONSUMERS INT’L, Apr. 10, 2013, http://www.
consumersinternational.org/news-and-media/news/2013/04/japan/#.UsHv-2RDt3Y (last visited May 17,
2014).
148
Japanese Litigation Update, supra note 135, at 9.
149
Id.
150
Sugawara, supra note 8, at 6-7.
151
ANDERSON MŌRI & TOMOTSUNE, supra note 6, at 2.
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hishadantai (Specified Qualified Consumer Organizations) (“SQCO”). 152
Some have speculated that the existing QCOs will be designated SQCOs
under the new law.153 The difference between QCOs and SQCOs is found in
their fee structure. The new law incentivizes SQCOs to bring more
lawsuits.154 A QCO cannot charge fees for its litigation, whereas a SQCO is
allowed to receive fees and costs from class members who reach the second
stage of litigation.155 The new law allows SQCOs to bring five types of
claims, called Kyotsuu gimu (common obligations)156:
a) claims for performance based on contractual obligations, b)
claims for unjust enrichment, c) claims for damages caused by
defaults on contractual obligations, d) claims for damages due
to product defect liability, and e) claims for damages caused by
unlawful acts (Fuhoukoui).157
The new law cannot be used for all types of recovery. Recovery for kakudai
songai (consequential damages), jinshinsongai (physical injury), isharyou
(pain and suffering), and lost profits are not available under the new law.158
The new law retains the two-stage approach included in the 2012
proposal.159 The SQCO files the lawsuit in the first stage,160 wherein “the
court will render a declaratory judgment on the common liabilities of the
accused business operator[.]”161 If the court renders its judgment in favor of
the SQCO, the process moves to the second stage, where damages are
determined for individual consumers.162 In the second stage, the SQCO and
the defendant, upon the SQCO’s request, provide notice to potential
claimants.163 The claimants then allow the SQCO to present their claims
before the court.164 The court allows the defendant to approve or reject the
claims—if the claims are approved, then the claimants succeed and the
152

Nishigaki & Yoshida, supra note 1, at 2.
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
See id.; Takeho Ujino, Japan: New Class Action System, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Mar. 24, 2014,
http://www.iflr.com/Article/3322767/Japan-New-class-action-system.html (last visited May 7, 2014);
JAPAN TIMES Fraud, supra note 120.
161
Ujino, supra note 160.
162
Id.
163
Nishigaki & Yoshida, supra note 1, at 3.
164
Id.; Ujino, supra note 160.
153
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litigation ends.165 If the claims are rejected, the court follows a “Simplified
Determination Procedure,” only examining documentary evidence.166 “If the
consumer objects to a determination reached in a Simplified Determination
Procedure, then the case tracks ordinary litigation procedure.”167
Some expect that the introduction of class actions will increase
Japanese courts’ caseloads.168 Larger caseloads may necessitate an increase
in the number of Japanese attorneys169 and could fundamentally change the
structure of the Japanese legal system. An increase in attorneys and
litigation, coupled with a pro-consumer perspective, may change the
Japanese public’s perception of the legal system from a shameful option of
last resort to a more acceptable method of dispute resolution. As Japan
implements its new class action law, Japan should look to the U.S. system to
examine potential benefits and drawbacks to class action litigation. As the
new law has provisions similar to those found in the United States,170 this
comparison is appropriate. The recent passage of Japan’s class action law
allows this author to present developing U.S. class action case law in a
unique and meaningful way. Japan can examine U.S. case law to anticipate
where problems interpreting or applying the new class action law may arise.
IV.

CLASS ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES

Class action litigation in the United States is well developed171 and
supported by numerous court decisions and statutes.172 As explained below,
the United States provides an important and practical base for developing
Japan’s class action system. Indeed, some aspects of Japan’s new law have
apparent similarities to U.S. law.173 For example, the U.S. legal system also
imposes requirements of commonality and numerosity for class actions.174
165

Nishigaki & Yoshida, supra note 1, at 3.
Id.
167
Id.
168
Ida Torres, Government Passes Measure for Class-Sction Lawsuits to Seek Monetary Damage,
JAPAN DAILY PRESS, May 24, 2013, http://japandailypress.com/government-passes-measure-for-classaction-lawsuits-to-seek-monetary-damage-2429465/ (last visited May 17, 2014).
169
Id.
170
See Nishigaki & Yoshida, supra note 1, at 2-3 (describing “Common Obligations” and stating that
“claims [must] relate to damages owed to a ‘considerably large number of persons.’”).
171
James Cooper, Class Action Issues, REACTIONS, Dec. 2011, available at http://www.clydeco.
com/uploads/Files/Publications/2012/1112_Legal_analysis.pdf.
172
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23; Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 USCA § 1711 (2005);
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156
(1974); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
173
Nishigaki & Yoshida, supra note 1, at 2-3 (describing “Common Obligations” and stating that
“claims [must] relate to damages owed to a ‘considerably large number of persons.’”).
174
See id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
166
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This Part briefly explains class action lawsuits in the United States,
ultimately recommending that Japan should examine portions of U.S. class
action laws in order to aid introduction of its new law.
A.

Purpose of Class Action Lawsuits

Generally speaking, there are three widely accepted purposes of a
class action system: access to justice, efficiency (judicial economy), and
deterrence. 175 Class action lawsuits enable plaintiffs to participate in
lawsuits that are otherwise financially impracticable.176 When a plaintiff
suffers minimal damages, filing a lawsuit may prove financially
infeasible.177 This comment argues that the stress and costs of a lawsuit may
understandably deter a person from filing a lawsuit where they have little to
no financial incentives. Class actions allow plaintiffs to spread “litigation
costs among numerous litigants with similar claims.”178 The class action
allows these plaintiffs to participate (though minimally) in the legal process
and recover for small, but meaningful, wrongs done to them.179
Class action systems also promote efficiency180 and consistency in the
judicial system. 181 An incident harming thousands of people could
substantially tax the legal system if the plaintiffs each filed individual
complaints and demanded individual results.182 Numerous problems arise
175

Richard A. Nagareda et al., THE LAW OF CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER AGGREGATE LITIG. 25-26
(2d ed. 2013); Catherine Piché, Cultural Analysis of Class Action Law, 2 J. OF CIVIL L. STUDIES, 101, 103
(2009); Class Actions in Canada: A Guide for Defendants, MCCARTHY TÉTRAULT 3 (2002),
available at http://books.google.com/books?id=wc-yMkw9pbcC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=
false; THE Y.B. OF CONSUMER LAW 2008 299 (Christian Twigg-Flesner et al. eds., 2008) available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=KQBGqoBP-68C&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false.
176
See Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1270 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[C]lass actions often involve
‘an aggregation of small individual claims, where a large number of claims are required to make it
economical to bring suit.’”) (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 813 (1985)).
177
MCCARTHY TÉTRAULT, supra note 175, at 3.
178
U.S. Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 403 (1980).
179
For example, the Federal Trade Commission settled claims with Airborne and Walgreens
regarding misleading advertising on dietary supplements. See Airborne Cold Remedy Settles Suit For
$30M,
CBS
NEWS, Aug. 14, 2008, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/08/14/health/main4350532.
shtml?source=RSSattr=Health_4350532; FTC Tells Consumers They May Be Due a Refund If They
Purchased Walgreens “Wal-Born” Cold and Flu Supplements, FED. TRADE COMM’N, Nov. 1, 2012,
http://ftc.gov/opa/2012/11/walgreens.shtm (last visited May 17, 2014).
180
TIMOTHY D. COHELAN, COHELAN ON CAL. CLASS ACTIONS § 1.04 (2001); see Nagareda et al.,
supra note 175, at 25-26.
181
Farah Z. Usmani, Inequities in the Resolution of Securities Disputes: Individual or Class Action;
Arbitration or Litigation, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 193, 206-07 n.107 (2001).
182
See Klay, 382 F.3d at 1270 (stating that “[h]olding separate trials for claims that could be tried
together ‘would be costly, inefficient, and would burden the court system’ by forcing individual plaintiffs
to repeatedly prove the same facts and make the same legal arguments before different courts”) (quoting In
re Terazosin Hydrochloride, 220 F.R.D. 672, 700 (S.D. Fl. 2004)).
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from this scenario. Courts would waste time sorting through the same fact
pattern multiple times, and litigants would be dissatisfied as different courts
may reach different conclusions.183 Combining similar cases into a single
action saves the judiciary time and provides a consistent result.184 Providing
parties with consistency can protect the reputation of the judicial system.
Additionally, filing the suit as a single action protects judges from an
overwhelming workload; court systems may be busy enough without the
additional, duplicative claims.185
Class action suits deter harmful behavior towards consumers.186 With
the threat of a class action lawsuit and the potential for large fees and
damages awards, this comment argues that companies have incentives to
avoid class action lawsuits altogether. Companies may find that they can
best avoid class action lawsuits if they avoid causing harm to consumers, or
potential plaintiffs, in the first place. In a successful class action lawsuit, the
defendant may have to pay substantial amounts of money.187 In addition to
their own legal expenses, they may be liable for the plaintiffs’ legal
expenses,188 treble damages,189 and potential fines for illegal activity.190 As
these cases may involve several attorneys, and the harm to plaintiffs may be
substantial, class action lawsuits may prove disastrous for defendants. Even
the threat of a class action lawsuit can deter a potential wrongdoer.191

183

See id.
Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 402-03 (1980) (stating that “[t]he justifications that led to the development
of the class action include the protection of the defendant from inconsistent obligations . . . ”); Klay, 382
F.3d at 1270 (explaining that “class actions ‘offer . . . substantial economies of time . . . ’”) (quoting In re
Terazosin Hydrochloride, 220 F.R.D. at 700).
185
See Klay, 382 F.3d at 1270.
186
See John C. Coffee Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and its
Implementation (COLUM. L. AND ECON., Working Paper No. 293, 2006).
187
See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008) (jury award of USD 5 billion reduced
on appeal).
188
Adele Nicholas, The Changing Class Action Litigation Landscape (Aug. 5, 2013), available at
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/08/05/the-changing-class-action-litigation-landscape (observing that
“[t]he cost to defend a class action suit can be astronomical, and many statutes allow the lawyers for
prevailing class plaintiffs to recover their attorneys’ fees from the defendant”).
189
Lynn H. Pasahow et al., TREBLE-DAMAGES REMEDY 9 (1987), available at http://books.google.
com/books?id=ToFquxup3SoC&pg=PA9&lpg=PA9&dq#v=onepage&q&f=false (last visited May 8, 2014)
(noting that “[a] treble-damages claim may proceed as a class action if the usual requirements of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 are met”).
190
Dana Rosenfeld & Daniel Blynn, The “Prior Substantiation” Doctrine: An Important Check On
the Piggyback Class Action, 2011, available at http://www.kelleydrye.com/publications/articles/1537
(explaining that “there is nothing to prevent a private litigant from filing suit against a consumer product
advertiser or manufacturer after a regulatory agency takes action against the same company and obtains
redress for consumers”).
191
MCCARTHY TÉTRAULT, supra note 175, at 3-4.
184
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The Structure of the United States’ Class Action System

The structure of class action lawsuits in the United States is relatively
straightforward. A class action complaint in the United States typically
contains one or more of the following causes of action: a consumer rights
claim, a securities and antitrust claim, an environmental claim, a mass torts
claim, or a civil rights claim.192 Named plaintiffs file these claims on behalf
of the class.193 The named plaintiffs in a class action lawsuit may receive a
financial incentive for acting as class representatives.194 The class itself may
contain hundreds or thousands of plaintiffs.195
U.S. class actions begin with the certification process. 196 In the
United States, the class action is either allowed to proceed or it ends due to a
failed certification.197 In the U.S., Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a)
and (b) set forth the threshold requirements for class certification.198 Rule
23(a) sets out four requirements: 1) numerosity; 2) commonality; 3)
typicality; and 4) adequacy.199 In more detail, these requirements state:
(1) [T]he class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to
the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.200

192

Janet Cooper Alexander, An Introduction to Class Action Procedure in the United States, CONF.
DEBATES OVER GROUP LITIG. IN COMP. PERSP. 3 (2000), available at http://law.duke.edu/grouplit/
papers/classactionalexander.pdf.
193
See Class Action: An Overview, LEGAL INFO. INST. (LII), http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/class_
action (last visited Apr. 17, 2014).
194
Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An
Empirical Study 3 (N.Y.U. L. & ECON., Working Paper, 2005) available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1043&context=nyu_lewp. It is notable that named plaintiffs face costs such as
opportunity costs of time, stress related to the case, and risks of retaliation or harm to reputation when they
act as named plaintiffs. These costs explain why named plaintiffs may receive financial compensation for
their role. Id.
195
Class Actions Overview: The Basics of Class Actions, JUSTIA, http://www.justia.com/trialslitigation/class-actions/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2014) [hereinafter Class Action Overview].
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See Alexander, supra note 192, at 6.
197
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
198
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
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Id. at 23(a); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Duke, 564 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2548 (2011);
Alexander, supra note 192, at 4.
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ON

JUNE 2014

THE NEW CLASS ACTIONS IN JAPAN

815

Courts will not certify a class if the plaintiffs fail to meet one of these
factors.201
Although these requirements seem simple, this comment argues that
they can create complications for plaintiffs and courts. Plaintiffs who do not
follow the class action requirements face the possibility of having their case
dismissed. 202 Courts that do not adhere stringently to the certification
process may face an overwhelming and complicated lawsuit, requiring the
court to pay significant attention to individualized facts and thus removing
many of the benefits of class action litigation.203 Combined, Rule 23(a)’s
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements aim to
protect the interests of the class members and ensure that joining plaintiffs’
claims reduce the workload of judges.204
Once a court certifies the class, the named plaintiffs and their
attorneys provide notice to all unnamed plaintiffs who belong to the class.205
The unnamed plaintiffs are persons who suffered some harm in the same
manner or incident as the named plaintiffs, but are not required to appear in
court to individually prove the harm they suffered. 206 The unnamed
plaintiffs may rely on the named plaintiffs to proceed with the lawsuit.207
Courts automatically consider unnamed plaintiffs members of the class, but
as explained below, sometimes give unnamed plaintiffs the opportunity to
opt out of the class litigation.208 Once the class litigation concludes and if
the class is victorious, the unnamed plaintiffs who have not opted out may
receive compensation for the harm they suffered.209
After meeting the basic requirements of Rule 23(a), a class must meet
one of four criteria listed under Rule 23(b).210 Rule 23(b) is used to specify
what type of class action is filed, including a suit where notice is optional, a
limited fund action, a civil rights action, or a suit for damages.211 Not all
201

Id.
See Alexander, supra note 192, at 6.
203
“Dissimilarities within the proposed class are what have the potential to impede the generation of
common answers.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (citing Richard A. Nagareda, Class
Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 131–32 (2009) [hereinafter Nagareda
2009]).
204
See Nagareda et al., supra note 175, at 25-26.
205
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). Notice requirements differ for 23(b)(1)-(2) classes and 23(b)(3) classes.
If the class is a 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) class, “the court may direct appropriate notice to the class.” For a
23(b)(3) class, “the court must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the
circumstances . . . ” Id.
206
Class Action Overview, supra note 195.
207
See id.
208
Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S. Ct. at 2558; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
209
See Class Action Overview, supra note 195.
210
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
211
Id.
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lawsuits are suitable for each category. A suit where notice is optional under
Rule 23(b)(1)(A) is appropriate where inconsistent adjudications would
result in standards of conduct that are incompatible for parties defendants.212
Such a class may only seek declaratory or injunctive relief and cannot seek
compensatory damages.213 Further, class members may not opt out of the
class.214 Once the class is certified, all qualified members of the class are
included; this is necessary because inconsistent adjudicatory results would
impose inconsistent obligations on the defendant.215
The second category of class action lawsuits is a limited fund suit.216
These are properly certified when adjudications made to individual members
of a class would be dispositive to the interests of the other class members.217
These suits likewise do not allow class members to opt out.218 For example,
imagine a limited fund class containing one hundred plaintiffs, with a total
of USD 100,000. When individual damages are assessed, each individual is
claiming USD 10,000. This means USD 1,000,000 in damages is claimed,
but only USD 100,000 is available to satisfy those claims. If each plaintiff
were to receive the amount they are fully entitled to from the fund, the fund
would only support ten plaintiffs fully and leave the remaining ninety
plaintiffs with nothing. A limited fund suit ensures that each class members’
interests are partially protected, and that no single class member receives
compensation to the detriment of another class member. 219 Each class
member is treated equitably.
The third category is for civil rights lawsuits. 220 Rule 23(b)(2)
provides that “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act,”
making injunctive or declarative relief appropriate.221 Plaintiffs used this
type of class action through the 1970s and 1980s to enforce federal welfare
and civil rights laws. 222 Under Rule 23(b)(2), plaintiffs may maintain
lawsuits for monetary relief, but this relief must be incidental.223
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Id. at (1)(A).
See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., PLEADING AND PROC. STATE AND FED. CASES AND
MATERIALS 800 (10th ed. 2009).
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FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A) & (3)(A); HAZARD, supra note 213, at 800.
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HAZARD, supra note 213, at 800.
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217
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The final category of class action lawsuits encompasses damages class
actions.224 In these lawsuits, “the primary function of subsection (b)(3) has
been to provide an aggregation device for damages suits, and most class
actions in which damages are sought are (b)(3) rather than (b)(1) or (b)(2)
suits.”225 Matters brought under Rule 23(b)(3) are subject to additional
requirements not demanded of other class action lawsuits.226 These include
the predominance and superiority requirements. 227 The predominance
requirement demands that class-wide questions by the class predominate
over any individual questions that class members may have. 228 This
comment discusses the predominance requirement further in the next section,
in the context of Wal-Mart v. Dukes229 and McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch.230
The superiority requirement mandates that a class action lawsuit must be the
superior form of adjudicating the matter.231 Rule 23(b)(3)(A)-(D) provide a
list of factors for the judge to consider when evaluating superiority,
including whether individuals should control their own case, the extent of
litigation already underway, the desirability of concentrating litigation in a
particular forum, the difficulties in managing the matter as a class action,
and possible alternatives to a class action lawsuit.232
C.

Tradeoffs in the United States’ Class Action System

Class action lawsuits disrupt the traditional American litigation
narrative. 233 For example, “[a] fundamental premise of American
adjudicative structures is that clients, not their counsel, define litigation
objectives.”234 The American class action system turns this premise on its
head. Class actions facilitate litigation for a massive number of individual
claims but forgo the opportunity and benefits of litigating claims
individually.235 Class action invites the possibility that “the lawyer [will]
represent[] an aggregation of litigants with unstable, inchoate, or conflicting
preferences.”236 Class actions sacrifice individualized remedies in order to
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see Nagareda et al., supra note 175, at 92.
HAZARD, supra note 213, at 821.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
Id.
Id.
Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2548 (2011).
McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2012).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
Id. at (A)-(D).
See Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1183 (1982).
Id.
See id.
Id.
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afford plaintiffs the opportunity to shift focus to structural reforms237 and
institutional practices. 238 For example, the 1966 reform to the class action
portions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure aided plaintiffs in litigating
public, rather than private, issues.239
Litigants and courts in the United States traditionally justify class
action lawsuits based on economic efficiencies, viewing them as a practical
means of providing litigation for claimants.240 In many instances, “[t]he
effect of the conduct under attack on any single individual is too small to
justify a traditional lawsuit seeking compensation. But in the aggregate the
impact is substantial enough to be a target for redress . . .”241 This system
creates a tradeoff for plaintiffs. Though the system gives claimants the
opportunity to bring suit for otherwise financially impractical causes,
plaintiffs may lack control over their attorneys.242 Moreover, class actions
may overlook certain subgroups within the class. 243 Still, class action
lawsuits make more information available to the courts; such information
results from the added resources of having several parties and attorneys
involved in the dispute. 244 Providing judges with greater access to
information is an example of an economic efficiency that class action
lawsuits can provide.
Class actions are important because they provide individuals with a
collective problem the opportunity to be heard. As Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals Judge Richard Posner stated, “[t]he realistic alternative to a class
action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a
lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”245 Still, some argue that modern class
actions, particularly in the mass tort context, shield defendants and provide
237

Rhode, supra note 233, at 1186.
One area where class actions have been particularly effective is “institutional litigation.” These
lawsuits typically seek to rearrange some aspect of a public institution, such as in a prison or a school, and
require ongoing judicial supervision of the determined remedy. Id. at 1184 (“[I]nstitutional reform class
actions have made and continue to make an enormous contribution to the realization of fundamental
constitutional values—a contribution that no other governmental construct has proven able to duplicate.”);
Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation,
93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 467-68 (1980).
239
Abram Chayes, Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 5-6 (1982).
240
See id. at 28; Nagareda et al., supra note 175, at 25-26.
241
Chayes, supra note 239, at 27.
242
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 1343, 1346 (1995). But see Rhode, supra note 233, at 1205 (stating that “many attorneys make
considerable efforts to appreciate and accommodate the broadest possible spectrum of class sentiment”).
243
Rhode, supra note 233, at 1224.
244
See Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes,
and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 146 (2011); see David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation
Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 852 (2002).
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“a means by which unsuspecting future claimants suffer the extinction of
their claims even before they learn of their injury.”246 In the mass tort
context, this argument is supported by courts’ willingness to accept
settlement agreements of dubious value, attorneys’ fees inducements, and
passivity of persons whose harm has not yet arisen.247
Another concern with class action lawsuits in the United States is how
settlement agreements are paid out.248 Coupon settlements, where class
members are given discounted prices off of products or services,249 could
potentially leave class members with “awards of little or no value.”250 Such
settlements may leave plaintiffs in the unpleasant position that their
attorneys would receive fees in cash, while plaintiffs themselves would
receive coupons redeemable with the company being sued.251 While the
passage of the United States’ Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 may have
lessened coupon settlement abuses,252 other concerns remain. For instance,
in the certification stage, plaintiffs must struggle to determine the numeric
limit of class membership, as having too many class members will attract
judicial scrutiny amid concerns of predominating individual issues. 253
Recent Supreme Court decisions show that the plaintiffs’ sword is blunted at
best.254
The next section explores how the American Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and U.S. case law are relevant to the creation of a Japanese class
action system. Examining U.S. case law highlights legal confusion and
disagreement in American class action law. By looking at the current
tensions within the American system, Japanese lawmakers can prepare for
and avoid judicial disagreements underway in the United States.
Additionally, the next section examines whether the American system
achieves the theoretical goals of class action law. This comment examines
the Wal-Mart and McReynolds cases, asking whether Rule 23(a)(3)’s

246

Coffee, supra note 242, at 1350.
Id. at 1351.
248
See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2 §2(a)(3)(A) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. §
1711-15).
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John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
288, 307 (2010).
250
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John H. Beisner et al., Class Action “Cops”: Public Servants or Private Entrepreneurs?, 57 STAN.
L. REV. 1441, 1446-47 (2005).
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Coffee, supra note 249, at 307; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1712.
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See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556-57.
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See infra §(IV)(D) (showing that numerosity and commonality may hinder plaintiffs’ ability to
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commonality requirement and Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement
undermine those goals.
D.

Wal-Mart and its Impact on Class Certification

In the three years following the Wal-Mart v. Dukes decision, the case
has been cited over 1,500 times in cases and over 380 times in law review
articles.255 Wal-Mart fundamentally changed the landscape of American
class actions.256 In Wal-Mart, a class of 1.5 million current and former
female employees sued Wal-Mart, alleging discrimination relating to wages
and promotion opportunities.257 The plaintiffs sued as a Rule 23(b)(2) class,
requesting backpay in addition to injunctive and declaratory relief.258 The
district court certified the plaintiffs as a class, and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the certification.259
Since classes must demonstrate that they meet Rule 23(a)
requirements, 260 including commonality, the Wal-Mart plaintiffs were
heavily scrutinized.261 Plaintiffs used statistical evidence, anecdotal reports
of discrimination from approximately 120 employees, and testimony by a
sociologist to try to satisfy the commonality requirement.262 The evidence
failed to convince the U.S. Supreme Court, however, which determined that
the plaintiffs did not meet the commonality requirement.263 As the Court
explained, commonality asks not whether there are common questions, but
whether there are common answers.264 The Court found it difficult to find
common answers in Wal-Mart: with 1.5 million plaintiffs, the class
contained significant differences in job positions, pay, age, and so on.265
The class members’ interests likely diverged.266 The Court found no single
common question uniting the plaintiffs.267
The dissent in Wal-Mart explained the difficulty with the majority’s
reasoning, observing that the majority blurred the distinction between Rule
255

See generally Shepard’s Report: Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541.
See Barry M. Kazan & Gabrielle Y. Vazquez, Viability of Rule 23(b)(3) Cases After ‘Dukes’,
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23(a)’s commonality requirement and Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance
requirement. 268 The Court refused to certify this class because the
differences between class members destroyed commonality, precluding a
common answer or adjudication that would be appropriate for every class
member.269 Whether this merged the Rule 23(a) commonality requirement
and the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement is up for debate,270 but
nevertheless, the 23(a)(2) commonality requirement is now a higher standard
post-Wal-Mart.
Wal-Mart and the heightened commonality standard provide a useful
starting point for examining commonality and numerosity within the
Japanese class action system. Japan’s new class action law strengthens the
country’s existing consumer-based group litigation system. 271 It allows
Japanese courts to award compensatory damages for harm done to
consumers, but does not allow for emotional or physical damage claims.272
Although this new system does not go as far as the U.S. system, it is
considered a “step toward an American-style class action system.”273 Still,
not everyone is convinced that a class action system will work in Japan.274
When Japan does implement its class action system, understanding the
difficulties that U.S. courts have had with commonality and numerosity will
be useful.
Wal-Mart began a jurisprudential dialogue on class action certification
in the United States. One year after Wal-Mart, in McReynolds v. Merrill
Lynch, the Seventh Circuit evaluated the class certification of 700 securities
brokers.275 Writing for the majority, Judge Richard Posner distinguished
McReynolds from Wal-Mart. 276 Where Wal-Mart consisted of “a class
action by more than a million current and former employees [and was]
unmanageable,”277 the McReynolds case, by contrast, fell on the other side of
268
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See id. at 2561-66 (J. Ginsburg, dissenting).
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273
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Before the law was passed, one attorney stated that “[t]he whole idea of Japan adopting class
actions is totally nonsense . . . There is no way that will ever happen.” Osaki, supra note 141.
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McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 488 (2012). This case
is relevant to Japan as it shows a large class seeking individual damages in addition to injunctive relief. In
lawsuits similar to this one, individual damage awards may require individual determinations, potentially
destroying commonality and predominance. Though Japan’s bifurcated system may address these issues,
examining them is useful to illustrate a difficult task for judges—evaluating the merit of individual claims
in such a large class.
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Id. at 488.
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the “line that separates a company-wide practice from an exercise of
discretion by local managers.”278 The Wal-Mart case involved a “policy of
[managerial] discretion [which] produced an overall sex-based disparity,”279
whereas the McReynolds policy was a company-wide practice.280
The managerial discretion exercised in Wal-Mart and McReynolds is
difficult to distinguish.281 It is easier to distinguish the cases on other
grounds, such as by the number of class members and the fact that
McReynolds presented fewer case management problems for the presiding
judge.282
One key difference between the two cases is the use of Rule 23(c)(4)
in McReynolds.283 Rule 23(c)(4) states that, “an action may be brought or
maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.”284 Judge
Posner explained that “[t]he practices challenged in [McReynolds] present a
pair of issues that can most efficiently be determined on a classwide basis,
consistent with [Rule 23(c)(4).]”285 After Wal-Mart and McReynolds, class
action litigants face uncertainty in both how to construct their claims and
whether those claims are likely to succeed.286
Three recent cases have added to the basic framework provided in
Wal-Mart and McReynolds. Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans &
Trust Funds287 and Comcast Corp. v. Behrend288 represent the latest class
action case law from the U.S. Supreme Court.289 Butler v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co.290 is the latest response by Judge Posner and the Seventh Circuit to the
U.S. Supreme Court. Amgen involved a securities fraud complaint where
the Court concluded that questions of law or fact do not have to be proven as
278
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a prerequisite to class certification.291 In what could be seen as a step back
from Wal-Mart’s intense examination of commonality, the Court took
another course in Comcast.292 In Comcast, the Court required that a class be
capable of measuring damages on a classwide basis prior to certification.293
Like Wal-Mart, this decision placed heightened demands on plaintiffs’ to
prove their case.294 Butler was remanded to the Seventh Circuit in light of
Comcast,295 providing Judge Posner with another opportunity to soften the
impact of the Supreme Court’s increased demands on class action plaintiffs.
The claims in Butler arose from a defect in Sears washing
machines.296 As Judge Posner explained, the lawsuit was “really two class
actions because the classes have different members and different
claims . . . One class action complains of a defect that causes mold . . . the
other of a defect that stops the machine inopportunely.” 297 The U.S.
Supreme Court instructed the Seventh Circuit to reevaluate certification
based on the Comcast decision.298 Judge Posner concluded that the first
issue, the mold defect, constituted a problem that was common to the entire
class.299 He determined that liability could be measured by “individual
hearings” and that the “parties probably would agree on a schedule of
damages based on the cost of fixing or replacing class members’ moldcontaminated washing machines.”300 If problems arose as litigation went on,
the class could be broken up into subclasses under 23(c)(4) or (5).301 For the
second issue, the court determined that class certification was appropriate as
“it was more efficient for the [defect] issue . . . to be resolved in a single
proceeding than for it to be litigated separately[.]”302
After explaining why class certification was appropriate for the issues
in Butler, Judge Posner went on to distinguish Comcast.303 He explained
that Comcast holds “that ‘the first step in a damages study is the translation
291

Amgen Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 1190.
Comcast Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 1433.
293
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“The unstated assumption underlying the Supreme Court’s decision in Comcast is that the
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Vazquez, supra note 256.
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296
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Id.
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299
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of the legal theory of the harmful event into an analysis of the economic
impact of that event.’”304 In Comcast, the damages methodology created a
theory of liability and identified damages that may not have been the result
of the specific wrong alleged.305 By contrast, the damages in Butler could be
attributable only to issues claimed by the class members.306
As the calculation of damages in Comcast is readily contrasted with
the applicable calculation in Butler, Judge Posner asked: “[W]hy did the
Supreme Court remand the case to us for reconsideration in light of
[Comcast]?” 307 He explained that the remand must be based on “the
emphasis that the majority opinion places on the requirement of
predominance and on its having to be satisfied by proof presented at the
class certification stage rather than deferred to later stages in the
litigation.”308 When a theory of damages liability includes damages that
may be attributable to acts other than the claims alleged by the class, it
allows for the possibility that questions that affect only individual members
might predominate over questions common to the class.309 This comment
argues that such a scenario appears to violate Rule 23(b). This comment
argues that in effect, the U.S. Supreme Court’s concern over damages
calculations in Comcast was an extension of its ongoing concern that
plaintiffs meet Rule 23(b)’s predominance requirement.310
The judicial dialogue between the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme
Court is ongoing.311 It could be some time before plaintiff attorneys have a
clear understanding of the scope of Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance
requirement, the permissible uses of Rule 23(c)(4), and what is necessary to
satisfy Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement. At first glance, the Comcast
decision appears to focus solely on the importance of tying specific damages
to specific claims, but this comment argues that the decision also strengthens
Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement.
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PREDOMINANCE AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A JAPANESE CLASS
ACTION LAW

As Japan develops its own class action system, it will help to examine
the tensions within U.S. case law over interpreting the commonality and
predominance requirements. Japanese lawmakers should be wary of how
they construct class action laws, as unclear laws or ambiguities left for
judges to resolve may undermine and weaken the class action system as a
tool for plaintiffs. If Japanese attorneys are concerned with commonality
and predominance issues, they may forgo such a class action suit entirely in
favor of joinder, individual actions, or other alternatives, such as arbitration
or no lawsuit at all.
Examining the U.S. class action system reveals a number of issues
that Japanese lawmakers implementing a class action system will need to
consider. Japan should plan how the new class action law will develop over
time—whether Japanese plaintiffs will be allowed to structure a class action
lawsuit without a SQCO, whether future class members will be able to opt
out (such as a Rule 23(b)(3) class) or not opt out (as in a Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
limited fund class), or whether members will be required to opt out to
preserve individual claims. This Part explains why Japan should observe the
current atmosphere around class action law in the United States. Lastly, this
comment considers an alternative perspective—whether the United States
has more to gain from observing Japan’s new class action law—and offers
concluding remarks.
A.

Japan Should Observe the Case Law Development of the U.S. Class
Action System

The U.S. class action system demonstrates the strengths 312 and
weaknesses 313 of class actions generally. The jurisprudential dialogue
between the Supreme Court and Judge Posner demonstrates that some
aspects of class action certification remain unsettled and controversial within
the United States.314 The Wal-Mart decision showcases a trade-off between
the practicality of trying the case and serving justice.315 The Court rightly
considered the justiciable difficulties that would arise from having a class of
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one million people, pointing to the likelihood that individual issues would
predominate over the issues presented by the class as a whole. 316 The
outcome of Wal-Mart, however, shows that companies can be “too big to
sue.”317 If a company policy harms a large enough number of people—and
the policy does not overtly discriminate—the company may argue that a
class action is not appropriate because individual issues would predominate
due to the class size.
Class actions do not always present David versus Goliath stories.
There is a contradiction in a system designed to allow large numbers of
plaintiffs with small claims to sue for the sake of efficiency, while
simultaneously rejecting classes where excessive size creates a
predominance of individual issues. Still, the Wal-Mart decision shows that
too-large classes can present judicial management problems. 318 Japan
should take this into consideration as it implements its own class action law.
Japan’s new law does not take effect for a few years,319 leaving ample
time to further research and prepare for potential problems or unwanted
consequences of a class action system. Japan should draw from the U.S.
experience and develop its own well-articulated class action system.
B.

Components of the U.S. Class Action System that Would Benefit
Japan’s Class Action Development

Japan may benefit by incorporating parts of the U.S. class action
system into its own system. First, this section explains how integrating the
U.S. class certification process will address some of the problems observed
in Japan’s legal system. Then it explains why having a legally defined class
action system is beneficial to any legal system.
The new Japanese class action law already incorporates pieces of the
U.S. class certification process.320 The new system,321 includes requirements
similar to the U.S. numerosity and commonality certification
requirements. 322 These two components will help ensure that Japanese
judges certify class actions only when the consumers’ claims are similar
316
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enough to be efficient to resolve in a single action.323 By requiring a
sufficiently large number of plaintiffs who suffered from the same harm, the
judiciary can save time by having one fact-gathering session for the entire
class.324 This requirement benefits judges because they do not have to hear
the same set of facts numerous times, and it benefits plaintiffs who can rely
on a SQCO to represent them in court.
The two-stage process325 in Japan’s new system reduces judicial waste,
but it may not provide consistent results for all consumers. Plaintiffs must
allow the SQCO to present their claims to the court.326 Once the SQCO files
the consumers’ claims with the court, the court allows the defendant to
approve or reject claims.327 Courts may approve some claims, ending those
claimants involvement in the litigation,328 whereas courts may reject others’
claims, requiring further litigation.329 The new law should incorporate a
standardized system to determine the result for all plaintiffs. Consistency
will protect the reputation of the judiciary and will ensure that each person
receives justice equally.
The new class action system does not appear to include the typicality
and adequacy components of U.S. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a).330
These requirements may be lacking because in the new system class action
suits are not brought by individual plaintiffs—they are brought by a
SQCO—and there are no named plaintiffs. One benefit of the typicality and
adequacy components is that they appear to serve as a second review of the
class members, making certain that the harm suffered by the class members
is similar enough to warrant group action. Though neither typicality nor
adequacy appears to fit within the current framework of Japan’s class action
system, implementing a mechanism to double-check or review the
relationship between members of a proposed class could be invaluable.
Mistakenly certifying a class will necessitate a court to do additional and
costly fact-finding. Japan should consider including an additional safeguard,
such as requiring all SQCOs to provide an independent report for the court;
the report could demonstrate the similarities between the harm done to the
plaintiffs.
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Other components of the U.S. class action system may not fit well in
Japan, such as the ability for some plaintiffs to receive treble damages331 for
harm done to them. Though it may add to the deterrent effect of class action,
that component incentivizes lawsuits and runs counter to the longstanding
Japanese philosophy of legal restraint.332 Japan has long been a state of legal
restraint.333 Professor Yosiyuki Noda of the University of Tokyo has argued
that “[t]o an honourable [sic] Japanese the law is something undesirable,
even detestable, something to keep as far away as possible . . . To take
someone to court . . . is a shameful thing[.]”334 While consumer redress by
means of collective action is important, it should not necessarily produce an
increase in litigation generally. Increasing the incentive to file a lawsuit
appears inappropriate for Japan.
Most importantly, Japan can look to recent U.S. court decisions on
class action law to predict difficulties and questions that may arise within
Japan’s class action system. As the Wal-Mart and McReynolds cases
demonstrate, there is tension between the ability of judges to adequately
manage and address common questions—and find common answers—when
there are massive numbers of plaintiffs and the objective of class action
lawsuits to promote efficiency, consistency, and fairness. As Japan refines
its own class action law, it should examine how U.S. judges have dealt with
these issues.
C.

Should the United States Look to Japan for Class Action Answers?

While the majority of this comment is dedicated to the argument that
Japan should examine the U.S. class action law, the confusion and
disagreement apparent in current U.S. jurisprudence on class actions
suggests that it is the United States who should follow Japan’s path. Japan’s
new class action law is distinct from U.S. class action law because it creates
a bifurcated class action system.335 That is, the judiciary makes an initial
determination of liability in the first stage and, if the defendant is found
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liable, it is followed by a second stage of individual damage
determinations.336
Though the new Japanese class action law only allows for limited
types of recovery,337 it provides a blueprint for U.S. class action litigation
governed by Rule 23(c)(4). Under Rule 23(c)(4), U.S. courts may certify
issue classes.338 In the United States, a class can theoretically be certified on
a singular issue, and litigation can proceed to resolve defendants’ liability to
that class.339 If the defendants are found liable, then a second-stage damages
determination could proceed.340 However, in practice, it is very difficult for
U.S. plaintiffs to certify classes under Rule 23(b)(3) and 23(c)(4) due to the
predominance concerns raised by Wal-Mart.341 Moreover, even where U.S.
plaintiffs successfully avoid predominance concerns in the liability phase by
becoming certified as an issue class, as they did successfully in McReynolds,
U.S. courts still express doubt that such plaintiffs could be successfully
certified in a subsequent damages phase due to the predominance of
individual issues.
To address the predominance and commonality concerns voiced by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Wal-Mart and McReynolds, U.S. litigators should
examine how the Japanese two-stage proceeding works, and see whether it
substantially burdens the judiciary. Japan’s new law provides creative
solutions to lighten the burden on the judiciary during the damages phase.
For example, where a defendant is found liable in the first phase, a fullfledged trial to determine damages does not necessarily ensue because
individual plaintiffs must first submit claims for their damages, giving
defendants an opportunity to accept or reject the claims.342 Only damages
claims that are still disputed are sent to a full trial.343 The United States
could look for other alternatives as well. The damages determination could
be based upon a damages schedule set by the trial court, wherein the
damages awarded are based upon specific conditions being met, or
alternatively, class members could be required to arbitrate their damages
336
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with defendants. By looking to Japan’s new law, U.S. litigants can observe
the efficacy of the two-stage process.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In recent years Japan has made significant changes to its legal system.
The creation of new, dedicated-law schools and reforms to the judiciary
exemplify these changes. More significantly, Japan passed class action
legislation that it will implement within the next three years. The new class
action system is another step in reforming the Japanese legal system.
Japan’s new class action system will include components that are similar to
those found in the U.S. class certification process—including the
certification prerequisites of numerosity and commonality. These are
valuable pieces of a functional class action system because they help
promote judicial economy. As shown by U.S. case law, however,
numerosity and commonality can give rise to difficult legal questions for the
judiciary and impair plaintiffs’ access to the court via a class action. As it
begins to implement its own class action law, Japan should examine the U.S.
system to improve its chances of success. Japan’s new class action law is a
courageous attempt to protect consumers.
Just as Japan will benefit from examining U.S. class action
jurisprudence, the United States can improve its own class action system by
examining Japan’s new law. The new Japanese law uses a bifurcated
process, separating liability and damages phases for class members. This
two-stage process can be theoretically implemented in the United States
using Rule 23(c)(4). Japan’s new law may satisfactorily account for
concerns relating to predominance, commonality, and judicial management.
U.S. litigants will benefit by observing this system in action. By studying
each other, litigants in Japan and the United States may find creative and
successful means of litigating class actions.

